If we had to choose a name for the operation, Operation Golden Hand would be appropriate for the means attacked (GOLD PAGER) and the objective achieved by the mission.
The operation to attack Hezbollah pagers in Lebanon required an effort shared by almost the entire intelligence community. Such an operation has elements of awareness, deception, technological and operational intelligence, and a remotely controlled operational edge. The division of roles in such operations is quite clear and requires cooperation between the technological elements that collect the preliminary intelligence, those who build the framework story, and those in charge of the foreign operations. In Israel, these are mainly the Intelligence Department with its technological units such as “Unit 81” and the Israeli Mossad with its skills in areas related to the supply chain.
Consciousness: Motivating Hezbollah to “Urgent Action”
In February of this year, following a series of targeted assassinations in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah decided to look for a solution that would allow them to transmit messages but without Israel having the ability to listen to the conversations and, in particular, locate the operatives by locating the location of the transmission.
The newspaper “Asharq Al-Awsat” noted at the time that Israel has almost complete control over the Lebanese telephone networks through malware attacks, phone calls, and infiltration of the broadcasting stations. The newspaper reports that in light of In response to these developments, Hezbollah called on its operatives to turn off or abandon their mobile phones during operational movements.
The decision to equip the organization is usually made by the 4400 Procurement Unit and the 900 Security Unit, and they apparently do so through Front companies based in Beirut that import communication equipment for dual use. The goal assigned to them was to order one-way pagers that would enable all of the organization’s important operatives to be activated when entering war, while maintaining functional continuity in the event of an attack on the organization’s wireless communications system.
Operation “Sting”: Penetrating the “Supply Chain”
Israel has apparently managed to identify that Hezbollah is looking to purchase pagers in commercial quantities. It is likely that this information was obtained by intelligence through one of the intelligence community’s options. The system now has an opportunity to “sting” the organization by identifying and penetrating its supply chain.
A technological unit specializing in explosive devices
At the same time, a technological challenge was apparently underway to analyze the pager device and find a way to arm several thousand devices in a relatively quick manner so that they could be triggered to explode at a given moment and remotely controlled. Such an effort requires technological research of a prototype and a series of feasibility trials. According to foreign publications, there are one or two units in Israel that provide such services to the intelligence community. One of them is the well-known Intelligence Directorate’s technological unit and the other is a unit that studies explosions related to ground operations.
Hezbollah’s procurement and distribution centers
According to the device, the way to set it up for detonation is not only through cyber operations identified with Unit 8200, but rather through a combined effort that includes, as stated, building a prototype. Reaching the enemy’s supply chain, selling contaminated equipment, or dumping a contaminated component that makes its way to Lebanon. Each such route has its own execution time. If you create an “operational opportunity,” you can contaminate the device during production and packaging. If you penetrate the supply and transportation chain, you can break into the warehouse or container and replace the main component, which is the battery, in a way that is easier to do and faster, but if there is a chance, what about the possibility that the organization will decide to replace the batteries?
Zero Hour
At 15:30, the signal was given and the remote switch was pressed in the control center and the base stations in Lebanon began To transmit the digital message that triggered the chain reaction on the motherboard of Hezbollah operatives’ pagers that led to the battery waking up and the explosion of the tiny but powerful explosive buried in the device.
But wait, how does it even work?
Even before the two-way cell phones that allow us to transmit videos today via Wi-Fi, we had another form of communication in the 1990s, and it was done through a system that could only transmit instant text messages. They were called “pagers” – a portable device that allows the organization to transmit instant messages to dispatch emergency and security workers. In Israel, it is known as a “pager” and is also used, using encrypted Motorola devices, to dispatch doctors, pilots, and special forces via a base station and from there via relays that spread the message, simultaneously, throughout the country and can reach a small group up to thousands of people at the same time.
A pager is actually a small, personal radio receiver that you carry in your pocket. You have a personal number and anyone who wants to send you a message enters that number with the message they want to send. This transfers them to a “switchboard” from which the messages are broadcast and from there the message is sent via radio wave to a nationwide network of radio antennas in the hope that the user is somewhere near one of them.
All pagers of Hezbollah’s pager system subscribers have a “code number” and it is entered into the distribution list. They will receive within five seconds the message sent to them at 3:30 PM from the Dahiya Square until it is received by the device.
What will happen now is that the battery will come to life and the pager will start buzzing while receiving a binary message and translating it into a text display with the date and time. In this case the message contains a command that not only displays a ceremony but also instructs the pager’s processor to act and activates not only the battery but also the detonation component in the device. Now another second or two will pass depending on the timing factor decided upon in the “Q Lab” of that intelligence organization.
Those who quickly pull it out now will pay with hand and eye injuries and those who were busy driving or shopping will experience the explosion while it is still in one of their pockets or bags. The explosion in the pocket is what caused most of the casualties, as one of the main arteries also passes through there.
What do we know about the specific pager model?
In the late 1990s, Gold Apollo developed a completely new alphanumeric pager and began marketing it worldwide, with many Middle Eastern countries among its customers.
According to a senior security source in Lebanon, the order was placed about five months ago, and the Israeli Mossad planted tiny, powerful explosives inside the 5,000 pagers during that time, until delivery about three months ago.
Recently, the company has begun to focus on these RF products for applications required by hospitals, delivery companies, and other organizations. The pagers manufactured by the company operate somewhat differently and can use one of two POCSAG protocols. The company’s products, which were identified by Hezbollah in Lebanon, based on the stickers and the device’s structure, can only be obtained in the thousands through wholesale purchases, which were made through one of the following two supply routes:
The manufacturer of the device – in principle, Gold Apollo’s factories are located in Taiwan, but the company claimed that they used a subcontractor called “BAC” which is based in Budapest, Hungary, and is the one that delivered the order to Lebanon. The pager manufacturer claimed that they had apparently undergone “adjustments” after being exported. The Hungarian company specializes in rating and financial analysis services for companies operating in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Hungary and the United Kingdom, as well as a unique special search service aimed at helping economic entities develop their business activities by locating and establishing contact with new customers.
The distribution company – the AR-924 model of the device sold to Hezbollah has authorized suppliers, including a distribution system through a website that specializes in marketing it to the Middle East, and in particular to Jordan and Lebanon, through distribution points, one of which is located in Jordan itself.
Receiving the shipment – a shipment of thousands of devices can arrive by air or sea. The change in the manufacturing components in a way that turns the phone into an explosive device can be carried out using the same operational opportunity that handled the products or an operation that allows the container to be intercepted and one of the device components to be contaminated. The easiest part is to contaminate the batteries by replacing them with armed batteries.
The “trigger” that leads to the explosion:
Once the message is received, the “ultra alkaline” battery that is in the phone’s “saving” mode now receives a “wake-up” message and then activates the vibration motor and displays the message on the data screen.
If you received a beeper message, you usually look to find or turn on the phone to call back and find out what’s going on.
The advantage of a pager over a cell phone is that it can receive quick, immediate messages, and for that reason, they are much more efficient than phones. The main circuit board is smaller and the batteries that pagers have last much longer, so you can carry them around without worrying too much about charging or replacing them.
Another advantage is that the pager receives high-frequency radio signals, which allows them to reach farther and the transmission suffers less from geographical obstacles than we encounter with reception problems with a cell phone, which is what makes this old device still common among emergency teams.
Unlike cell phone text messages, which are transmitted via SMS and are received at best within 30 seconds to minutes (due to reception problems and congestion). Messages to a pager are sent and received within five seconds. Some models of pagers have two-way capability, but the advantage of one-way communication is the absence of a radio transmitter that could expose the user to location identification or disrupt other electronic equipment in the transmission itself.
An endless series of explosions and injuries
At least 12 people were killed and nearly 4,000 were injured when pagers used by Hezbollah members exploded on September 17, 2024 around 3:30 p.m. throughout Lebanon and neighboring provinces in Syria.
According to the Saudi Al Hadath channel, dozens of Revolutionary Guard operatives stationed in joint frameworks with Hezbollah as part of various projects were among the casualties in Syria.